In group key agreement protocols, it is important to consider the effects of existence of malicious insiders. In this paper, we define a type of key-control attacks and the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders. Then, we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes key-control attacks (as well as key-integrity attacks) into consideration, and construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality. The construction is efficient enough for practical uses, being comprised of 2 rounds and n messages for n-party groups.
Introduction

Background:
A group key agreement protocol is one of the most important and primitive cryptographic protocols. Recently, more concerns have been emerging of group key agreement protocols [1] . Informally, group key agreement protocols have three basic requirements: key freshness, key integrity and key authentication. The key freshness requires a generated session-key by a protocol session to be independently distributed of other session-keys generated by other protocol sessions. The key integrity requires all session-keys of honest parties resulting from a protocol session must be identical. The key authentication requires secrecy of session-keys, i.e., outsiders cannot obtain any information of sessionkeys by eavesdropping conversations of protocol among parties.
Historically, a (group) key agreement protocol is first considered and made use of in a two-party case, such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Formal security of two-party key agreement protocols is defined by Bellare and Rogaway [2] that defines a notion of sessionkey indistinguishability (SK-security) of two-party key agreement.
Boyd and Nieto [3] showed a natural generalization of the SK-security to the cases of group key agreement and showed a SK-secure group key agreement protocol (which we call protocol BN), assuming a broadcast channel. However, later it turned out that the SK-security is not sufficient for security of group key agreement. We need to consider insider attacks more carefully in group key agreement. For example, it is possible that a malicious insider makes a selected honest party alone in a group, that is, making its obtained session-key different alone, resulting violation of the key integrity.
Katz and Shin [6] cast the security of group key agreement into the framework of Universal Composability (UC) [4] in order to consider effects of insider attacks. In general, the UC-framework defines security of cryptographic protocols by ensuring that the protocols mimic the behavior of a corresponding ideal trusted third party, called an ideal functionality, under any adversarial environment. [6] defines an ideal functionality F KS05 of group key agreement that guarantees the key-integrity of group key agreement protocols even with existence of malicious insiders under any environment and constructs a generic compiler that takes a SK-secure group key agreement protocol and transforms it into the one that securely realizes the ideal functionality F KS05 .
The key-control attacks: Desmedt et al. [5] shows a notion of key-control attacks that aims to capture an adversarial behavior by malicious insiders that violates the key freshness. The adversary A is a pair of a shielded malicious insider A I and an outside eavesdropper A O . Before a protocol execution, A = (A I , A O ) chooses some distribution of session-keys. After this, A I is not permitted to communicate with A O . In the protocol proceeding, the insider A I generates his 'bad' protocol messages in order to control the session-key generation and to result in a session-key that belongs to the distribution chosen in advance. This would establish a private channel for the adversary A = (A I , A O ). Because A I is shielded in sessions of group key agreement protocol, detection of forming such a private channel is difficult. This type of key-control attacks may apply to group key agreement protocols that securely realize the functionality F KS05 , simply because F KS05 does not take into account any such type of attacks. Our contribution: In this paper, we define a type of key-control attacks and the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders, following [5] . Then, we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes key-control attacks (as well as key-integrity attacks) into consideration, and construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality. The construction is efficient enough for practical uses, being comprised of 2 rounds and n messages for n-party groups. Setup: We assume the following setup throughout the paper. 1. The Broadcast Channel: Parties use cryptographic broadcast channel to send and receive messages. 2. The common reference strings (CRS). 3. A static adversary : The adversary has to determine which parties to corrupt at the beginning of protocols. 4. Session id and subsession id: Any instance of protocol is performed under a unique pair (sid, ssid) of session and subsession id's.
Key-Control Attacks
First, we define a type of key-control attacks and define the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders, following [5] .
Key-Control Games:
Let π be a group key agreement protocol and A = (A I , A O ) be a feasible adversary for it.
Stage 1 (Initialization):
A O chooses a session-key κ randomly from the key space and sends κ to A I . After this point, A O is not permitted to communicate with A I .
Stage 2 (Protocol Executions): A protocol
instance of π is performed on a session-id sid and a subsession-id ssid among a group gid of parties, with the shielded-insider A I that is able to corrupt any parties in a group gid * (⊆ gid).
Stage 3 (Adversary goal):
We say that the adversary A = (A I , A O ) wins if there exists some party in gid -gid * that outputs κ as the sessionkey.
Definition 1 A group key agreement protocol π is defined to be secure against the key-control attacks, if any feasible adversary A = (A I , A O ) is not able to win the key-control game with respect to π except with a negligible probability for any sid, ssid, gid, gid
* .
In addition, we recall security against the key integrity attacks, informally.
Key Integrity Games:
Goal of malicious insiders A in the key integrity game is to cause honest parties to compute different session-keys. We say that the adversary A wins the game, if there exists some honest party who computes a different session-key from other honest parties in a protocol session with malicious insider A.
Definition 2 A group key agreement protocol π is said to be secure against the key integrity attacks, if any feasible adversary A is not able to win the key integrity game except with a negligible probability (for any sid, ssid, gid, gid * ).
An Ideal Functionality F GKA for Group Key Agreement
In this section we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes the key-control attacks (as well as the key-integrity attacks) into consideration.
Assumptions on PRF:
We use pseudorandom function families with additional properties: seed-collisionresistance and seed-one-wayness. The seed-collisionresistance of f means that no feasible adversary can find two different seeds s, s resulting in the same value:
Definition 3 (A Seed-Collision-Resistant PRF [6])
We say a family of pseudorandom functions f = {f s } s is seed-collision-resistant if there is an efficient procedure Sample such that the probability
is negligible in k for all feasible adversaries A.
[6] proves the existence of a seed-collision-resistant family assuming the existence of a one-way permutation.
The seed-one-wayness means the one-wayness of seeds of f in a following form: Definition 4 (A Seed-One-Way PRF) We say a family of pseudorandom functions f = {f s } s is seedone-way if the probability
is negligible in k for all feasible adversaries A and n.
An ideal functionality FGKA of Group Key Agreement.
Let k be a security parameter, and {fs}s be a pseudorandom function (PRF) family. Let sid and ssid denote a session id and sub-session id, respectively, and gid = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote a group of parties. The ideal functionality FGKA proceeds as follows with an adversary S. • We remark that the seed-one-wayness of f with n = 1 follows from its pseudo-randomness trivially. For general n we do not have a proof for it. Now we define an ideal functionality F GKA of group key agreement that takes the key-control attacks into consideration, as Figure 1 . If all parties in a group gid are uncorrupted, F GKA proceeds just like F KS05 . If any party is corrupted, F GKA proceeds as follows. For uncorrupted parties P i , F GKA chooses random nonces N i for P i , and sends N i to the ideal-process adversary S. For corrupted parties P j , F GKA waits for S to send nonces N j for the corrupted parties P j . Then,
with V i = (sid||ssid||P i ) using a pseudorandom function f , and delivers (sid, ssid, gid, κ) as a session-key.
Against the functionality F GKA , it is difficult for malicious insiders (who can select N j ) to control the generation of session-key κ even using key-control attacks, because they cannot cancel the effect of nonces N i of honest parties due to the way in which the pseudorandom function f is used to generate κ. Formally, we can show: Proof Sketch: Suppose, to the contradiction, that there exists a group key agreement protocol π that is not secure against the key-control attacks and securely realizes the ideal functionality F GKA with seed-one-way f = {f s } s .
Let A = (A O , A I ) be an adversary that wins the key-control game with respect to π with a nonnegligible probability for some sid, ssid, gid, gid * . We construct a following environment Z and an adversary A, using A. Z on input z = (sid, ssid, gid, gid * ) invokes A O and obtains its output κ. Then, Z invokes π among real parties gid (or F GKA among dummy parties gid) and invokes adversary A on input κ. When some party (∈ gid − gid * ) outputs κ , Z halts with output 1 if κ = κ or 0 otherwise. The adversary A on input κ simulates the behavior of A I on input κ.
By the assumption that π is not secure against the key-control attacks, when the above Z and A interact with π among real parties, the probability that Z outputs 1 is nonnegligible. Since π is assumed to securely realize F GKA , there must exist an ideal-process adversary S with which Z invokes F GKA among dummy parties and outputs 1 also with a nonneglible probability.
Using the above S, we construct an algorithm B that breaks the seed-one-wayness of {f s } s . On input κ and {v j = sid||ssid||P j } j∈gid * (and an auxiliary input z = (sid, ssid, gid, gid * )), B proceeds as follows. B generates nonces N i for honest parties P i ∈ gid− gid * , and with κ = κ⊕ Pi∈gid−gid * f Ni (sid||ssid||P i ), B invokes S on κ , mimicking the behavior of Z, and simulates the interaction of (Z, S) and F GKA among dummy parties. In the simulation, B gives N i as nonces of honest parties to S, playing the role of F GKA . In turn, S would reply with nonces N j for corrupt parties P j ∈ gid * to the simulated F GKA . B outputs those
It is immediate that the above simulated view of S is perfect.
Then, S should output N j for corrupt parties P j ∈ gid * satis-
) with a nonneglible probability.
By definition of κ , this means κ = Pj ∈gid * f Nj (sid||ssid||P j )), contradicts to the seed-one-wayness of {f s } s . 2
Note that in the ideal functionality F GKA the key integrity is always ensured even if some parities get corrupted. As in the case of F KS05 [6] , we can show:
Theorem 2 Suppose a pseudorandom function family f = {f s } s satisfies the seed-collision-resistance. Then, any group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality F GKA is secure against the key integrity attacks.
Construction of Group Key Agreement Protocol in the AM
In this section, we construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality F GKA in the authenticated-link model (AM), in which an adversary is assumed to be not able to inject or change messages without being detected. (The next section shows a construction in a more realistic setting, that is, in the unauthenticated-link model (UM), where an adversary can inject or change messages.)
First, we consider realizability of the functionality F GKA . It is impossible for 1 round, 1 broadcastmessage protocol to securely realize F GKA . (If the initiator is corrupted, there is no way to prevent the key-control attacks.) We can construct 1 round, n broadcast-messages protocol that securely realizes F GKA by using some non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, but it is not efficient. In the below, we show there exists an efficient 2 round, n broadcast-messages protocol among n parties that securely realizes the functionality F GKA in the AM model.
The basic strategy of our protocol is as follows. 1. We enhance the Boyd and Nieto protocol [3] , that is the most efficient SK-secure GKAP assuming a broadcast channel. 2. We use some pseudorandom functions to generate MACs of the initiator's nonce to maintain the key integrity even under malicious insiders. 3. We also use some pseudorandom functions in a way to maintain the effects of nonces of honest parties even under malicious insiders that attempt key control attacks. Figure 2 shows the proposed group key agreement protocol in the AM. The initiator P 1 selects a k-bit random nonce N 1 and encrypts it for every responders, and sends (sid, ssid, gid, P 1 , (c 2 || · · · ||c n )) to all parties in gid = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }. Then, P 1 computes and stores
Upon receiving the ciphertext from P 1 , the responders P j decrypt the corresponding parts to get N 1 : (sid||ssid||gid||N 1 ) ← D dj (c j ). Then, P j chooses his random k-bit nonce N j , computes σ j = f N1 (v 0 ) and sends (sid, ssid, gid, P j , N j , σ j ) to all parties in gid. Receiving messages, each party P k in gid verifies the integrity of the nonce N 1 using the σ-values as in Figure 2 . If verified correctly, P k computes and outputs the session-key
Intuitively, since the initiator P 1 is encrypting nonce N 1 , the generated session-key κ is expected to be kept secret from an eavesdropper (key authentication). Since the integrity of the received nonce N 1 is verified through the σ-values, all honest parties should output the same κ or abort (If
by the seed-collision-resistance of f ). Thus, the construction would preserve the key integrity under malicious insiders. Moreover, the session-key κ is generated using the nonces N i of every parties P i , and the way of combining them as κ = f N1 (V 1 ) ⊕ f N2 (V 2 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ f Nn (V n ) would guarantee that even malicious insiders cannot remove the effect of the nonces of honest parties. Thus, the construction would preserve the keyfreshness under malicious insiders who attempt keycontrol attacks.
UC-security of The Construction
Formally, we can prove the following theorem: 
Proof Sketch:
We construct an ideal-process adversary S for any real-life adversary A such that no environment Z can tell whether it interacts with A and parties running the GKAP in the real world, or with S and (dummy) parties communicating with F GKA in the ideal process. The ideal-process adversary S: The ideal-process adversary S proceeds as follows. S internally invokes a copy of A. Messages from Z to S are forwarded to A, and messages from A to its environment are forwarded to Z. S generates public and private key pairs for all parties and an element v 0 in the domain of f . S gives the resulting (e 1 , . . . , e n ) and v 0 to A.
